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The practitioner from within:
revisiting the virtues
Frances Grodzinsky
Sacred Heart University USA
grodzinskyJ~sacredheart.edu

Abstract: Traditionally the study of computer ethics involves taking students who are not philosophically trained, exposing them to action-guiding theories, presenting them with the codes of
ethics of several companies and professional organizations and asking them to make ethical decisions in scenario-based cases. This approach is deliberately action-based and focuses on doing.
"What would you do?" is the traditional question we ask our students. While this pedagogical
methodology forces them to examine situations and argue from a particular point of view, it does
little to influence their character. They see the utilitarian or deontologist as someone other than
themselves. There seems to be very little internalization of these action-based theories.
Virtue Ethics offers character-forming theory that has been more successful with my students
than the action-based theories of computer ethics texts. Why? Virtue Ethics is directed toward
character development. The focus is on being rather than doing. It presents a good heuristic or
approach to the problem of moral agency. Virtue ethics offers a way of teaching self-reflection
through narratives that focus on core values, heroes and moral exemplars. It is grounded in practical
wisdom. It is experiential, learning to care about the self, others, the community, living the good
life, flourishing and striving for moral excellence. It offers a model for the development of character
and personal ethics which will lead to professional ethics. Yet, the strict Virtue Ethics espoused by
Aristotle has its limitations. This paper will explore the need for a more integrative approach to
contemporary moral theory, one that may be found by revisiting the virtues through the works of
Aristotle and Kant. It will offer insight into translating theory into practice for students of computer
science and information technology.
Keywords: Virtues, Aristotle, Kant, Core Values, Computer Ethics

Introduction: ethics and morality
estern society is confronted with moral and ethical
roblems on a daily basis. 1 Tabloids, soap operas, and
scandals scream about breaches of ethics, lying, immoral
behavior, etc. that bounce 'serious news' off the front page.
Information technology offers many opportunities for
breaches of morality. As users of computer technology, we
are faced with a myriad of ethical problems generated by
computer-mediated action. Invasions of privacy, using the
Internet for pornography and illegal access to information
and systems have become as newsworthy as the sex scandals
and more far-reaching. The response to these issues, at least
in the United States has been to try and pass laws to stop the
abuse. As we have seen, these attempts at regulation are
seriously disputed by those who value the freedom associated with the global information infrastructure and hacked
around by those with technological expertise.
As a professor of computer science and information technology, I believe that it is my responsibility to sensitize my

students, the future computer professionals and current users of technology, to the moral seriousness of these ethical
issues. It is my contention, after working with computer
ethics students for over four years, that there is a certain
level of amorality that needs to be addressed. Although action-guiding theory has predominated computer ethics texts,
I believe that my students have found more meaning in character-forming theories such as virtue ethics.
This paper will argue that solving discrete ethical problems as a deontologist or consequentialist is not enough. If
we are ever hopeful of tackling the serious macro-ethical
issues generated by computer technology on a more than
theoretical level, we need to examine how to handle the micro-based or individual problems of moral agency. All the
policies developed will be meaningless unless they impact a
group of individuals who are sensitive to ethical issues. As a
practitioner of computer ethics, I would like to suggest that
the philosophers who are seeking to define the philosophical
basis for this field might consider a more integrative approach that revisits the virtues. This would benefit those of
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us who are attempting to educate students to behave as moral
agents in their personal and by extension professional lives
by providing character-forming ethical theories on which to
structure our courses.

Character-forming vs. Action- guiding theories
I would argue that character-forming theories are more fundamental than action-guiding theories to the study of computer ethics. Attempting to teach students computer ethics
by telling them what to do in discrete situations based on
what a consequentialist would do, does not impact on their
character. And, "knowing what to do in any serious sense
requires good character; for the agent must have developed
certain abilities of judgment and perception over time, and
the exercise of these abilities is precisely what we mean by
good character". 2 The focus should be on hew to develop
'practical wisdom' and flourish rather than what to do in an
isolated situation.
Traditionally computer ethics texts and courses involve
taking students who are not philosophically trained, exposing them to action-guiding theories, presenting them with
the codes of ethics of several companies and professional
organizations and asking them to make ethical decisions in
scenario-based cases. This approach is deliberately actionbased and focuses on doing. "What would a utilitarian do? A
deontologist? What would you do?" are the traditional questions we ask our students. While this approach helps them
examine situations that may arise in the profession and teaches
them to argue from a particular point of view, it does little to
change their individual character. They see the utilitarian or
deontologist as someone other than themselves and there
seems to be very little internalization of these action-based
theories.
Virtue ethics offers character-forming theory that has been
more successful with my students than the action-guiding
theories of computer ethics texts. Why? Virtue ethics is directed toward character development. The focus is on being
rather than doing. It presents a good heuristic or approach
to the problem of moral agency. What does virtue ethics
offer? Virtue ethics offers a way of teaching self-reflection
through narratives that focus on heroes and moral exemplars. It is grounded in practical wisdom. It is experiential,
learning to care about the self, others, the community, living
the good life, flourishing and striving for moral excellence. It
offers a model for the development of character and personal ethics that will lead to professional ethics.

others. Practically speaking, a page on Kant or Aristotle does
not give one much with which to work. Some professors
argue, therefore, that foundations of ethics should be left to
the ethicists and kept out of computer science courses. Until
we are ready, however, to require philosophical ethics courses
of our students, most professors are caught in the quandary
of how to best teach computer ethics given their training
and background. I do not want to turn this into a debate on
who should teach computer ethics, which has already been
done by Deborah Johnson. Ideally, a team approach of an
ethicist and computer scientist would be 'the best of all possible worlds'. But until universities are willing to support
this, I am trying to find a realistic answer to a very difficult
problem of how to shake students who are used to dealing in
binary decisions out of their complacency about ethical issues by professors who are more used to being technical
wizards than moral mentors.
It is unrealistic to discuss computer ethics without merging the languages of technology, philosophy, psychology and
sociology. So it is limiting to read texts that only peripherally
touch on these subjects in relation to moral agency. Attempts
to define the moral theory underlying computer ethics seem
to take the narrow perspective of trying to fit it into an existing philosophical niche instead of trying a broader and more
integrative approach. This is particularly troublesome because computer ethics is by nature an interdisciplinary field.
Until recently, Aristotle and virtue ethics were not even mentioned in computer ethics texts although his work provides
insight into moral agency and practical wisdom, both applicable to the field. Yet, I do not want to dismiss virtue ethics
merely because certain critics view it as limited to the Greek
polls. The concept that we live a certain way and that our
actions grow out of the vision of who we are is too important to jettison. Personal intentions and dispositions guide
actions, and people who care about morality think of others
as well as themselves. Morality is knowing how to live and
act well. It depends on the humanity within oneself. Doing
the right thing is not about an action divorced from the self.
It is an action that flows from the self; it is internally rather
than externally imposed. Thus, there seems to be a justifiable reason to hold onto the concepts of Aristotle. Yet, it
would broaden the scope of ethical theory to reassess the
place of Kant in discussing the virtues. This would give us a
basis for a richer sense of morality (Louden, 1992) and perhaps, a more meaningful base on which to build contemporary moral theory.

Revisiting the Virtues: Broadening the Scope
Need for contemporary moral theory: A more integrative
approach
One problem for novices in the field of ethics, (I would
include most computer science professors in this category),
is the reductionist view of ethics presented by our current
texts. Each theory is presented as discrete, apart from any
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While ethicists such as Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor have re-introduced the language of the virtues into recent.
ethical theory, very few philosophers have looked to virtue
ethics as a realistic approach to computer ethics. That is
because they take what I believe to be a 'strict constructionist' view of virtue ethics restricted to and limited by the

mores of the Greek polls. Robert Louden in Morality and
Moral Theory and Nancy Sherman in Making a Necessity of
Virtue: Aristotle and Kant on Virtue make the case for the
reassessment of the role of virtue in contemporary ethics.
Both Sherman and Louden have taken the next step in revisiting the concept of virtue from the perspective of Aristotle
and Kant. Although Aristotle is known as the proponent of
what has come to be known as Virtue Ethics, there is evidence that Kant preserves the idea of virtue in his moral
theory as well. Sherman writes, "For it has not been adequately appreciated that Kant develops a complex anthropology of morals- a tailoring of morality to the contingent
features of the human case-which at times brings him into
surprising alliance with Aristotle and his project of limning
an account of human excellence". 3
Louden states, "Much contemporary argument in ethics
depends on over-simplified pictures of Aritstotle and (particularly) Kant. Such argumentation posits exhaustive alternatives that fit neither Aristotle nor Kant but only lesser thinkers. An available richness is therefore missing from current
moral argument, and part of my aim is to recover it".4 Both
authors offer insight and a new way of approaching ethical
theory that made sense to me as a professor of computer
ethics and has led me to revisit virtue ethics from a broader
perspective than the traditional agent vs. act debate. Louden
attempts to recover a richness lacking in current moral argument that "recognizes both the irreducible plurality of moral
values and the reality of irresolvable moral conflict and one
whose interest in moral deliberation is not distorted by an
extremist faith in a universal decision procedure (Louden,
'1992). Sherman elucidates the need for discussions of particulars, principles and emotions in dialogues on moral agency.
In their arguments and explanations, the authors demonstrate that when discussing the virtues, there is a place for
Kant as well as Aristotle.
It is beyond the scope of this paper and its author to
develop a detailed integration of the ideas of Kant and Aristotle
around the virtues, but I will attempt a brief summary of the
views of Louden and Sherman. What Louden is attempting
to do is to move ethics away from a single theoretical model
and incorporate a variety of irreducibly plural types of moral
value into its basic structure (Louden,1992). He believes
that both Aristotle and Kant in their respective theories sought
to describe how people actually think about moral issues and
then use the results of the analysis for normative purposes.
"In my view, the best approach to normative moral justification is via just this sort of descriptive account of moral agent's
actual moral view ,,.5Sherman seeks to examine each theorist's
account of the role of practical reason and moral perception
within virtue. While both authors acknowledge the differences in approach to moral theory by Aristotle and Kant,
they do not see them as irreconcilable and try to bring the
two philosophers into dialogue in a way that avoids oversimplification and caricature (Sherman, 1997).

Both authors answer the criticism commonly associated
with the theories of Kant and Aristotle. In citing from Kant's
The Doctrine of Virtue, Louden seeks to justify why one needs
to examine both the grounding and applying aspects of Kant's
ethics giving each its due. Both are necessary when trying to
apply moral theory to human life. Louden writes,
To summarize Kant's position.., nowhere does he assert that
human beingscan simplydeducecorrectmoraljudgmentsfrom
universal, timelessprinciples. "Empirical or 'anthropological'
knowledge is alwaysneeded when we apply moral theory to
human life; ... Kant acknowledgesrepeatedly that principles
and rulesare neverself-deployingand that non-ruledrivenjudgment is needed in ethicswheneverwe deliberateabout specific
cases. Moral principles, in his view,cannot simply tell us what
to do.6
Sherman reinforces this idea in her discussions on "The
Cultivation of Emotions as Supports for Duty and Moral
Anthropology". 7 On the Aristotelian side, Louden and
Sherman address the issue that the virtues represent "little
more than a conventional list reflective of the social climate
of his times". Both defend his virtues as being meaningful in
the realm of human nature and experience. While Aristotle
is not known for focusing on principles, Louden feels that it
is worth exploring the connection of the virtues with principles. Although Aristotle's analysis of higher-order considerations and principles are not as detailed as Kant's, he does
attempt to understand moral virtues in terms of what reason
prescribes, of how one ought to think and feel, of what nobility requires and of what is just at the end of Book II of
Nicomachean Ethics (Louden, 1992).
Both Aristotle and Kant share a fundamental interest in
the question of what basic constraints reason sets on the
moral life of human beings. Neither asserts that human beings can simply deduce correct moral judgments from universal principles. Both recognize the obvious necessity of
informed empirical knowledge in human practical reasoning. Each is concerned with the issue of what limits general
rational considerations place on morality. However, in neither case does this latter interest take the form of issuing
step-by-step rules that tell people what to do (Louden,1992).
While Kant's moral theory is generally regarded as action-guiding and Aristotle's as character-forming, does that
mean that Kant shows no interest in moral education and
character development or that Aristotle does not focus on
action? It seems obvious that in choosing to publish two
works: Education and The Doctrine of Virtue, that Kant must
have been concerned with both. In acquiring excellence of
character according to Aristotle, we have knowledge, choose
the act, choose it for its own sake, and the action must proceed from a fixed character. The virtuous person takes pleasure in this activity. He/she is one of action, not simply one
who theorizes about virtue. The language is about action.
Sherman and Louden conclude that there are both descrip-
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tive and normative aspects in the theories of Kant and Aristotle
although they differ by degrees. Neither of them sought to
guide moral practice 'from a position above or outside
it'...Their goal is not to govern practice from above but
rather to influence it from within". 8
Louden investigates whether Kant and Aristotle seek to
produce a moral decision procedure. In the Critique of Pure
Reason Kant asserts that carrying out rules is a sole concern
of ethics. Louden feels that reading this assertion as a strict
rule interpretation flies in the face of Kant's core thesis concerning autonomy and the need to think for
oneself.(Louden, 1992). Does adhering to the categorical
imperative contradict acting autonomously? Louden claims,
"But while autonomous agents who test their maxims by the
categorical imperative are 'following a rule,' they are not applying a moral decision procedure that can issue a definitive
solution to any specific moral problem. For insightful application of the categorical imperative always requires a judgment at a variety of levels".9 Sherman concurs that for Kant
the Categorical Imperative is a procedure for deliberationJ °
While Aristotle negates that universal rules and principles
can serve as arbiters of ethical correctness, he states in
Nicomachean Ethicsthat
It is difficult to get from youth up a right training for virtue if
one has not been brought up under right laws; for to live temperately and hardily is not pleasant to most people especially
when they are young. For this reason their nurture and occupation should be fixed by law;...since they must, even when they
are grown up, practiceand be habituated to them, we shall need
laws for this as well, and generallyspeaking to cover the whole
of life; for most people obey necessityrather than argument. H
Yet, although Aristotle recognizes a need for laws in the
public domain, he doesn't subscribe to them as a part of the
ethical domain. Sherman points out that for Aristotle, "To
have practical wisdom is just to have virtue internalized in a
non-codified way. However helpful moral rules of thumb,
Aristotle doesn't think of them as expandable into explicitly
statable rules... ''~2 He relies on experience and interpretation. So, although both Kant and Aristotle stress the importance in practical deliberation, neither subscribes to a moral
decision procedure that rules out the need for judgment and
interpretation.
By following the spirit of Aristotle and Kant, moral theorists, in demonstrating concern for the particulars and the
principles, can help people place their specific moral concerns within a larger(and more rationally justifiable) context
by 1) generalizing different types of relevant moral conflicts
for which historical records exist; 2)indicating, in encapsulated form, how such conflicts are addressed previously, by
both the wise and the ignorant; 3) advocating better alternatives that might otherwise be overlooked; and 4) rendering
judgments more consistent. 13 I agree that there is a need to
advocate pluralistic models that integrate, in a non-reduc-
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tionist way, strong notions of virtue and act. Ethics, especially computer ethics is non-trivial and certainly non-simplistic and we should use everything we can to make it meaningful. To quote Bernard Williams,
If there is such a thing as the truth about the subject matter of
ethics,...why is there any expectation that it should be simple?
In particular, why should it be conceptually simple, using only
one or two ethicalconcepts,such as duty or good state of affairs,
rather than many? Perhaps we need as many concepts to describe it as we find we need, and no fewerJ4
Perhaps we need to heed this advice in thinking about
computer ethics.
Core Values
What are we trying to impart to students? One issue is that
power necessitates responsibility and accountability. As James
Moor states in "Reason, Relativity and Responsibility in
Computer Ethics", ethical responsibility begins by taking
the ethical point of view. We must respect others and their
core values. If we can avoid policies that result in significant
harm to others that would be a good beginning toward responsible ethical behavior. ~5 We find the basis of these core
values in the language of the virtues.
In order to encompass the global nature of the world of
ICT, we should try to teach values that cross cultures. Before
asking our students to examine the complex and novel issues
of computer technology, we must first ask them to examine
themselves as human beings with values that motivate them
to live their lives in a particular manner. Both Louden and
Moor agree that there are a set of core values that are shared
by most humans. Moor cites life and happiness for humans
and includes other core values such as ability, freedom, knowledge, resources and security. "These values", he says, "are
articulated in different ways in different cultures but all cultures place importance on these values to some extent". ~6
These core values give us a way to evaluate the rationality of
our actions and policies. They give us reasons to favor some
courses of action over others. They provide a framework of
values for judging the activities of others as well (Moor,1998).
Basically, they give us a common ground for evaluation and
understanding. This is particularly evident in the multicultural
classroom where students are excited to find a mutually common ground amidst their different politics, cultural mores
and religious traditions.
Louden encourages us in a similar direction in his discussion of moral exemplars. He believes that when we look
at moral exemplars, there is no single scale of measurement.
Each is maximizing a value be it courage or selflessness or
integrity in his or her own way and situation. For Louden,
this is not a problem. He asks, "Why not say that moral
exemplars are simply those who successfully maximize a certain specified mix and amount of irreducible values". 17 He
further asserts that "It does seem to be the case that there

exists a family of core virtues that exemplars exhibit to a
strong degree--justice beneficence and honesty - but they
are not all stamped out of the same mold. We recognize that
morally excellent individuals are those that are disposed to
stand fast by their chosen principles and ideals". TM While
Moor suggests that this concept of core values offers a framework for analysis of policies in computer ethics, I would also
like to assert that it offers the computer ethics professor a
means of examining human behavior and illustrating examples
of living well, respect for others and flourishing in the true
Aristotelian sense of the word.
The study of moral exemplars who are not the "goodytwo-shoes" or saints whose behavior is super human offers
students insights into how ordinary people (although they
are extraordinary in terms of their ethics) manifest and maximize a set of core values that results in respect for others and
in caring for society as a whole. These exemplars can come
from both western and non-western cultures and should be
chosen by the students. They can range from the righteous
Christians of the Holocaust to the freedom fighters in a specific country; from the students in China during the uprising who delivered the news to the world, to the students who
spend their time in soup kitchens and building houses for
the poor; from Aaron Feuerstein who kept his business, that
had been all but destroyed by fire, open and supported his
workers with salary and health insurance while rebuilding,
to the software tester who protests the early release of untested critical software. This is a lesson of primary importance if our students are to be the developers and testers of
software, creators of new technology and policy makers of
the future. In asking students to identify their heroes and
then examining the traits of these people, the professor and
class can develop a profile of the characteristics of a hero.
Keeping weekly journals for a month which detail any ethical or moral issue the student encounters including acts of
moral exemplars, raises the level of moral consciousness in
the student and provides a base for further discussion and
expansion into moral theory.

Therefore as a computer scientist who teaches at a university, I am intimately involved with both the technical education and the moral education of students around the use of
computer technology.
The role of moral mentor is a daunting concept to those
of us whose expertise lies on the cutting edge of technology.
Do we have the practical wisdom to be our students' guide?
Aristotle believes that morality cannot be taught but needs to
be practiced, and Kant says that judgment cannot be instructed; it can only be exercised. It is my contention that
the computer ethics classroom affords the safe-haven for the
exploration of self-knowledge in relation to the serious moral
problems associated with computer technology. These problems are faced by us everyday at the university: Students
have had their projects erased from a shared network drive
by other students; computer software is available in the laboratories for anyone to copy; students have been flamed or
defamed on email sent globally; exposed to pornography; the
system has been compromised by a hacker and files are destroyed or lost; students submit plagiarized work; papers and
programs are copied from web sites; students are addicted
to role playing in MUD's just to name a few. Characterforming theories that focus on the role of moral agency challenge students to become more self-aware and reflective so
that they can appreciate the seriousness of these problems
and refrain from engaging in such acts. Students begin to
realize that living ethically is not about rules and formulas.
People are rational moral agents who have to interpret rules
according to their own experiences. For Aristotle, if we are
ever to achieve eudaimonia, we must learn to live our lives
welt and train our souls through our actions. The study of
obituaries is an effective exercise to raise the awareness of
students about what we mean by 'living well or leading the
good life'. Students are able to draw the correlation between
the character of the person as manifested in the adjectives
that describe his/her roles, e.g., loving mother, generous
friend, admired colleague and the support and care this person offered to his/her community.

The practitioner from within

Identity

Ideally, I believe that when the first computer goes into the
primary school, students should be taught acceptable on-line
behavior just as they are taught to be techno-experts. If this
practice were carried out throughout the early years of school,
I am convinced that we would have fewer problems on-line.
When these students arrive at the university, they would already be habituated to what constitutes virtuous on-line behavior and prepared for some serious ethical discussions
involving the macro or policy issues of computer ethics. At
this point they could approach, with more insight and sophistication, the complex ethical issues such as privacy using philosophical theories to support their positions. Unfortunately, the students today have not had this experience.

The concept of identity, especially how it has been influenced and changed by computer-mediated action is the subject for my next paper. Let me just indicate that traditional
university students are trying to cope with three visions of
the self: the perceived self, who a person thinks he/she is;
the real self, who he/she is at this time; and the ideal self,
who he/she wants to become) 9 The challenge of the professor is to make the real self aware of core values and ethical
issues so that it knows when it is appropriate to use a perceived or virtual self and how to use its imagination to envision the flourishing of the ideal self in the future.
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Imagination and narrative genre
One problem of teaching computer ethics is that often, when
discussing new technology, the impact or consequences of
that technology are unknown. This limits the value of the
consequentialist model. For example, once an email message is sent the sender has no control over what will happen
to it. Will it be globally forwarded to others? Will that cause
repercussions? It is unknown. One has to trust the recipient
of the message if the data is sensitive. A colleague reported
that in her hospital an email was received that said, "You are
sending confidential medical data to this email address and
the address is incorrect". Luckily this recipient was morally
responsible. Thus the focus on moral agency and manifestation of core values when using technology is imperative to
the teaching of computer ethics. I have already explained the
value of studying heroes and moral exemplars. Another valuable asset in the classroom is using stories. Narrative offers
insight into character behavior not simply actions in a particular scenario. Actions grow out of and are motivated by
the behavior of the character. Readers of stories and novels
are concerned with the "being" of the character, not simply
what he/she is doing. 2° Using stories to illustrate behavior is
not a particularly new technique; biblical stories have always
been used in religious schools. Sherman maintains that description and narrative of the particular case at hand are at
the heart of moral judgment for Aristotle. 2~ What is the place
of this narrative in the computer ethics classroom?
While there are few stories that have been written specifically about computer technology, science fiction has always explored the interaction of technology and human values. In reading the works of Arthur Clarke, for example, we
discover that what was considered fiction in the 40's and
50's is reality today. John Artz in "The Role of Stories In
Computer Ethics" writes, "Consider imagination as the creative capacity to think of possibilities. Imagination lets us
see the world, not as it is, but as it could be". 22 From R UR to
StarTrek, we are confronted with issues surrounding artificial intelligence and robots. This leads to moral considerations of freedom and slavery. Is Data just a machine who
can be dismantled at will, asks Captain Picard in Star Trek :
The Next Generation? Or, because he is self-aware, does he
have the right to choose whether to be part of an experiment
that will dismantle him.(Edgar, 1997). We can study the implications of Asimov's Rules for Robots, Brave New World,
1984, and Jurassic Parle. The Case of the Killer Robot also
investigates ethical issues specifically pertaining to the area
of computer technology. Through characters, students are
offered a chance to experience things that they may never
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experience. The broad appeal of this notion has led to the
popularity of virtual reality. What stories can do in entertaining us is to reinforce traditional values and challenge
others. Seeing the world as it could be allows us to make
choices about how it should be.(Artz,1998).
Louden defines imagination as "our ability to form meaningful mental images or concepts that are not directly derived from either sensation or standing propositions in any
rule-governed manner. Imagination is the ability to think in
novel ways (Louden 1992). Moral imagination helps us envision the type of technology and society in which we would
like to live. It also helps in moral deliberation by aiding us in
the interpretation of underlying metaphors. Therefore narrative genres can be useful in the computer ethics classroom
to raise awareness of moral behavior. I would agree with
Louden, however, that moral theory and argumentation
should be used by students to justify their moral positions
which could be based on the insights that they have found in
literature. Having students write a story that presents their
view on ethical issues and ICT to a group of aliens is an
interesting exercise that integrates imagination and moral
theory.

Conclusion
This paper has tried to add to the dialogue between the two
groups concerned with computer ethics: the philosophical
theorists, those concerned with moral theory and ethical issues and the philosophical engineers, the practitioners from
within who work with these problems daily and attempt to
educate the computer scientists of the future. As a member
of the latter group who is attempting to incorporate the theories of the former into her teaching, I challenge philosophers
and moral theorists concerned with computer ethics to approach the issues of computer ethics as more than just(albeit
how serious) an intellectual exercise. The answer to our mutual
concerns lies in open discourse between our groups: those
from without and the practitioners from within. The reality
of computer technology is that sooner or later we will all
become practitioners from within on many different levels.
We, therefore, need a commonality of language that will cross
the global infrastructure of Information and Communication Technology. I encourage all of us to appreciate that approaching computer ethics through moral agency does not
negate serious attention to action nor concern for objects in
the information infrastructure. Rather it adds one more dimension to a complex field and approaches computer ethics
as the integrative, global field that it is. •
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